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tions. Second, trade secret protection is minimized. Had the EPA been re-
quired to seek a warrant, Dow could have requested under law that any
evidence obtained be given special protection as confidential. By allowing the
EPA to secure detailed and sensitive pictures without a warrant, the scope of
trade secret protection shrinks. Third, the approach forces unnecessary deci-
sions between fundamental privacy interests and other values such as access
to unrestricted sunlight or safety. Since the Court equated all types of aerial
observation regardless of circumstance, roofs and walls are a must if privacy
from close-up pictures and surveillance is to be preserved. Fourth, more in-
trusive forms of technological searches are not precluded. Though the Court
suggests in dictum that a line may be drawn to preclude the type of
photography taken by a satellite, there is no reasoning to support the distinc-
tion. Thus, reasonable expectations of privacy diminish as technological in-
novation becomes more accessible to the public.
The four-step administrative search analysis proposed here better balances
the competing interests involved in any fourth amendment action. Searches
would be defined primarily by intent, not by expectations. Once the deter-
mination is made that a search occurred, the focus of analysis turns to the
reasonability of the search. Although some consideration of reasonable ex-
pectations are incorporated into this analysis, they are narrowly drawn and
deduced from specific legislative enactments, rather than left open to judicial
determination based on indeterminate factors. Searches must also be con-
ducted according to a regular schedule with the privacy interests of the
business entity firmly in mind. The approach is workable, understandable,
and fair.
Applying the analysis to the facts in Dow, it is not a foregone conclusion
that the EPA's search would have been unconstitutional. The most critical
determinations to such a finding would be the significance of air pollution as
a federal irterest, and probably more important, whether the EPA's inspec-
tion scheme adequately provided for the protection of Dow's legitimate
privacy interests.
Wade R. Wright
Criminal Law: Criminal Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees
Under RICO
Until the enactment of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tion Act (RICO) in 1970,' forfeiture of assets based on a criminal conviction
was a concept foreign to the laws of the United States. 2 When Congress
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982), amended by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (Supp. III 1985).
2. See Reed & Gill, RICO Forfeitures, Forfeitable "Interests", and Procedural Due Pro-
cess, 62 N.C.L. REV. 57, 59-69 (1983).
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enacted the criminal provisions of RICO, it adopted a new type of forfeiture
known as criminal or in personam forfeiture. Unfortunately, in enacting
RICO, Congress provided only the most fundamental statutory guidance on
the appropriate procedures for implementing this new penal sanction. With
the increasing use of RICO, 3 courts are confronting the multiplicity of issues
that encompass the legal transfer of a defendant's assets to the government
based on a finding of guilt. Courts are struggling to accommodate this new
penal sanction and to supply and define procedures where none exist.
4
This note addresses the diverse procedural problems presented by the in-
creasing use of the criminal forfeiture provisions in RICO. In particular, this
note focuses on the application of these vague provisions to the rights of
nondefendant third party attorneys. The note first contends that the current
procedures for criminal forfeiture under RICO violate the sixth amendment.
The statute fails to provide procedural safeguards against deprivations of the
right to counsel of one's own choice to the RICO defendant. The note then
proposes that these forfeiture provisions violate the fifth amendment because
the statute fails to provide protection against wrongful property deprivations
to either the RICO defendant or third parties.
Historical Background
The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 (CFA) was a conscious attempt
by Congress to escalate the war on crime, 5 while simultaneously offering
minimal procedural safeguards ignored in RICO. 6 The 1984 Act provides
3. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 193 (1984) (citing rise in number of RICO pro-
secutions); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1005 (1984); Project, White Collar Crime: A Second Annual Survey of Law, 19 AM. CRiM. L.
REV. 351, 353 n.1412 (1981).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1348 (5th Cir. 1983) (forfeiture issue
should be withheld from jury until general verdict has been returned, at which time judge should
instruct jurors and submit issue for special verdict), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); United
States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 1982) (setting guidelines for restraining order to
prevent RICO defendant from disposing of alleged forfeitable property); United States v. Veon,
549 F. Supp. 274, 280 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (government may not file lispendis on alleged forfeitable
property; government's interest does not vest until personal guilt of property owner has been
established).
5. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws (98 Stat.) 2040 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1963, 21 U.S.C. § 1963, 21 U.S.C. § 848). The
CFA added the following passage to the RICO forfeiture provision:
Any ... property [subject to forfeiture] that is subsequently transferred to a per-
son other than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture
and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the transferee
establishes in a [post-trial] hearing ... that he is a bona fide purchaser for value
of such property who at the time of purchase was reasonably without cause to
believe that the property was subject to forfeiture.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. III 1985).
6. See Reed, Criminal Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: Raising




that "any property subject to forfeiture that is subsequently transferred to a
person other than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of
forfeiture.'" However, the Act imposes upon the transferee the burden of
establishing at a post-trial hearing that he is a bona fide purchaser for value
who was without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture.,
Even before the enactment of the CFA, the judiciary attempted to define
and expand the blurred scope of RICO's forfeitable property "interests."
For example, in Russello v. United States,9 the Supreme Court stated that
where the term "interest" is not specifically defined in the RICO statute, it is
assumed that the legislative purpose is expressed by the term's ordinary
meaning, which comprehends all forms of real and personal property, in-
cluding profits and proceeds." Consequently, the insurance proceeds the
petitioner received as a result of his arson activities constituted an "interest"
within the meaning of section 1963(a)(1) and were, therefore, subject to
forfeiture. This expansion of the term "forfeitable interest," as evidenced in
Russello, and its effect on the property rights of parties who are not defen-
dants has led to many claims by the defense bar challenging the RICO and
CFA forfeiture provisions."
The long-term success derived by law enforcement from the use of
forfeiture under RICO and CFA depends not only on how regularly
forfeiture is pursued, but also on how well procedures established in those
statutes protect defendants and interested parties with valid objections to
forfeiture. The adequacy of those "protection procedures" is especially
suspect when the government seeks forfeiture of attorneys' fees. In requiring
the forfeiture of the assets used by a defendant to pay attorneys' fees, the
government loses nothing; rather, the government endeavors to curb the
practice of paying lawyers with the fruits of crime and of disguising the assets
of criminal organizations as attorneys' fees paid for services rendered.'"
In United States v. Rogers, 3 the Colorado federal district court stated that
RICO's forfeiture provisions do not require the forfeiture of attorneys' fees
paid for legitimate legal services. The court went on to explain that the
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. III 1985) "Special verdict is a statement by the jury of the
facts it has found-in essence, the jury's answers to questions submitted to it; the court deter-
mines which party, based on those answers, is to have judgment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1399 (5th ed. 1979).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. III 1985).
9. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
10. Id. at 21.
11. Stone, Criminal Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE, 2 J. L. & ETHICS
541, 542 (1986). In short, a prosecutor may reduce the pool of counsel available to the defendant
and constrain the attorney's ability to act on the defendant's behalf merely by indicating an in-
tent to seek forfeiture of fees paid, even though the prosecutor may not have sufficient grounds
to restrain assets. Id. Because of the potential adverse effects on the defendant's ability to retain
adequate representation, this article argues that the forfeiture provision as applied to attorneys'
fees is unconstitutional.
12. Id.
13. 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
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forfeiture provision's legislative history indicates that the only assets held by
third parties that are forfeitable are those transferred as a sham or artifice.
Because an attorney who receives funds for bona fide services rendered
engages in neither a fraud 'nor a sham, such fees are not forfeitable.'
In sum, it is obvious that the government is pursuing a laudable objective
of curbing the practice of paying lawyers with the fruits of crime. However,
the government's objective is achieved at the expense of jeopardizing a defen-
dant's right to meaningful representation in a criminal proceeding. In short,
a prosecutor may limit the counsel available to the defendant and constrain
the attorney's ability to act on the defendant's behalf merely by indicating an
intent to seek forfeiture of any fees paid, even though the prosecutor may
have no grounds to suggest that fees will be subject to forfeiture. Because of
the potential adverse effect on the defendant's ability to retain adequate
representation, this note argues that the forfeiture provisions of RICO as ap-
plied to attorneys' fees are unconstitutional.
Scope of the Sixth Amendment: Right to
Counsel Versus Right to Counsel of One's Choice
Before analyzing the constitutional claims in attorneys' fee forfeiture
cases, it is necessary to examine the sixth amendment jurisprudence on which
these claims are based. The sixth amendment guarantees the accused the right
to representation by counsel "in all criminal prosecutions." ' , In 1963 the
Supreme Court recognized the criminally accused's right to assistance of
counsel for his defense. 16 The right to counsel is absolute in the sense that it
cannot be denied without violating the fundamental principles of liberty and
justice.17 The courts have yet to uniformly define the degree of autonomy the
sixth amendment guarantees the accused in the selection of privately retained
counsel.
The Supreme Court, however, has qualifiedly recognized the sixth amend-
ment's guarantee to a criminal defendant of representation by counsel of his
own choice. In Powell v. Alabama," the Court observed that "it is hardly
necessary to say that, the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant
14. Id. at 1347. The statute is not designed to set aside legitimate transfers for value. The
legislative history notes that "the provision should be construed to deny relief [only] to third
parties acting as nominees of the defendant or who have knowingly engaged in sham or
fraudulent transactions." Id.
See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 193, 208 (1984). In analyzing subsection (m), the
Senate Report provides that "an order of forfeiture may reach only property of the defendant,
save in those instances where a transfer to a third party is voidable." Id.
15. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
16. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
17. Id. at 343. See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) ("That which is simple,
orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman may appear intricate, complex and
mysterious.").




should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice."' 19
Federal courts consistently cite the Powell decision for the proposition that
the right lo counsel of one's own choice is an implicit sixth amendment
guarantee. 10
Lower federal courts, like the Supreme Court, are committed to the sixth
amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel of one's own choosing.
However, all of the federal circuit courts have limited this constitutional
guarantee. In United States v. James2 and United States v. Phillips,22 the
Second and Sixth circuits, respectively, held that although the right of a
criminal defendant to representation of his choice is a right of constitutional
dimension, it is not an absolute guarantee.23 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit has
stated that the right to counsel of choice must be carefully balanced against
the public's interest in the orderly administration of justice. 4
The interest in providing the defendant a fair opportunity to defend
himself at trial seems stronger than the interest in preserving an attorney-
client relationship based on mutual trust. Thus, although a criminal defen-
dant's right to retain counsel is virtually unlimited, his right to counsel of
choice is qualified. 2
Courts may deny a defendant a continuance, for example, even though the
denial effectively prevents him from being represented by the counsel of his
choice. A defendant may request additional time to secure a lawyer's services
because he has failed to secure counsel at all, 26 because counsel has
19. Id. at 53. The Powell Court's reference to counsel of choice must be read within its fact-
ual context. The defendants convicted in Powell were charged with a capital offense but were af-
forded neither the time nor the opportunity to retain counsel on their own. Instead, the trial
court haphazardly "appointed all the members of the bar" to represent them at the arraignment,
with the expectation that some would continue to assist the accused at trial. Id. at 56.
20. See Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeitures
on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REv. 493, 506 (1986). See also United States v. Cicale, 691
F.2d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983); Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207,
208 (6th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982); United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485,
489 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979).
21. 708 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1983).
22. 699 F.2d 798 (6th Cir. 1983).
23. See generally United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 884, 890 (2d Cir. 1982); United
States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070 (2d Cir. 1982); cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984);
Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323-25 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Vargas-Martinez,
569 F.2d 110Z, 1104 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dinitz, 538 F.2d 1214, 1219-22 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977).
24. Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209-12 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982)
(recognizing the qualified right to counsel of choice that must be carefully balanced against the
public's interest in the orderly administration of justice).
25. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1983) (a state trial court did not violate a defen-
dant's sixth amendment right to counsel by denying defendant's motion for continuance until
the deputy public defender initially assigned to defend him was available). See also United States
v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Gray, 565 F.2d 881, 887 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978); United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 86 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977).
26. See, eg., United States v. Leavitt, 608 F.2d 1290, 1294 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
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withdrawn,27 or because he has become dissatisfied with counsel and desires
to be represented by someone else.2" Even if he has secured satisfactory
counsel, a defendant may seek a continuance because counsel needs addi-
tional time to prepare for trial29 or is unable to be present on the date due to
scheduling conflicts
30 or illness. 31
Unlike the qualified right of counsel of choice for paying defendants,
courts generally do not recognize any right to appointed counsel of choice for
indigent defendants.3 2 Thus, RICO defendants who have become indigent
(denial of second continuance after defendant failed to show good cause for delay in retaining
counsel during previous four months).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1069 (1979) (one of the two defense attorneys representing defendant withdrew on date of
trial); Lee v. United States, 235 F.2d 219, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (counsel withdrew on eve of trial
with leave of court).
28.'See, e.g., Urguhart v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984) (defendant
represented by appointed counsel requested continuance on day of trial in order to retain private
counsel); United States v. Sexton, 473 F.2d 512, 513 (5th Cir. 1973) (defendant who had had am-
ple time to employ counsel sought continuance to discharge court-appointed counsel and retain
private counsel); United States v. Pigford, 461 F.2d 648, 649 (4th Cir. 1972) (defendant sought
continuance to change private counsel); United States v. Hampton, 457 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 856 (1972) (indigent defendant requested time to discharge court-
appointed counsel and retain different counsel with newly available family funds); United States
v. Hollis, 450 F.2d 1207, 1208 (5th Cir. 1971) (court-appointed counsel sought discharge so
defendant could retain counsel).
29. See, e.g., Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1983) (original counsel required surgery;
substitute counsel appointed six days before trial claimed to be ready but defendant argued addi-
tional preparation time was needed); United States v. LaMonte, 684 F.2d 672, 673-74 (10th Cir.
1982) (substitute counsel sought delay to prepare where defendant dismissed original counsel
four days before trial); Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 207-08 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1162 (1982) (new attorney objected to going to trial only ten days after appointment as
counsel).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1082 (1983) (counsel had two trials scheduled the same day); Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318,
1320 (5th Cir. 1978) (same); United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 85 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 986 (1977) (attorney's schedule conflict would require several weeks of delay); United
States v. Inman, 483 F.2d 738, 739-40 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 988 (1974) (counsel
had two trials scheduled for same day).
31. See, e.g., Gracalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238, 1241-42 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 922 (1972) (attorney hospitalized); Reloford v. United States, 288 F.2d 298, 299-300 (9th
Cir. 1961) (same).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973, 986 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 926 (1973) (defendant has no absolute right to reject assigned counsel and demand another
after trial has begun); United States v. Morrissey, 461 F.2d 666, 669-70 (2d Cir. 1972) (denial of
defendant's request for new appointed counsel does not deprive him of constitutional rights
where reasons for change were insubstantial); Bowman v. United States, 409 F.2d 225, 226-27
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 967 (1970) (denial of defendant's request for continuance
to obtain counsel of his own choosing, on day of trial, was proper because "requests for ap-
pointment of a new attorney on the eve of trial should not become a vehicle for achieving
delay") (quoting United States v. Llanes, 374 F.2d 712, 717 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 917
(1967)). See generally Tague, An Indigent's Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 73 (1974) (suggesting a larger role for defendants in selecting appointed counsel).




when the government restrains all their assets until a conviction is final have
no right to choice of counsel. Rather, these indigents must rely on counsel
appointed or obtained through public defenders' offices.
Not only does an accused have a qualified right to counsel of his choice, he
has an absolute right to effective assistance of counsel. Speaking recently for
the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, Justice
O'Connor remarked that the purpose of the right to effective counsel is "to
ensure [that criminal defendants] receive a fair trial."' , In some cases the
performance of counsel may be so inadequate that, in effect, no assistance of
counsel is provided. The Court stated that the function of counsel in
representing a criminal defendant is to assist the defendant; and hence,
counsel owes his client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest.
The government violates this right to effective assistance of counsel when it
interferes with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about
how to conduct the defense.
34
Thus, it is crucial to analyze the sixth amendment's guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel in the context of RICO's forfeiture provisions. The
critical issue focuses on a potential violation of the sixth amendment's right
to effective counsel when the defendant's assets are restrained by court order,
requiring a court-appointed attorney. The issue is clearly one of constitu-
tional dimensions: Does the application of the RICO forfeiture provisions to
assets transferred in exchange for bona fide legal services impermissibly in-
terfere with the sixth amendment right to counsel?
Impact of Forfeiture of Attorney's Fees on the Right to Effective Counsel
and the Qualified Right to Counsel of Choice
Under the 1984 Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, the government may in-
dicate its intention to require forfeiture of attorneys' fees directly by in-
cluding in an indictment a request for forfeiture of all the defendant's assets,
or by motion for a pretrial restraining order covering the defendant's assets,
including those set aside to pay fees. 35 The scant legislative history of the Act
is silent with respect to attorneys' fees. 36 Thus, with the blessing of Congress,
pointed, a cour must appoint substitute counsel upon a good faith showing of "good cause,
such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication or an irreconcilable con-
flict." McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting United States v. Calabro, 467
F.2d at 986), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917 (1982). See also Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166,
1169-70 (9th Cir. 1970) (court's denial of early motions for substitute appointed counsel and
failure to inquire into reasons for defendant's dissatisfaction denied defendant's right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel where spite between them dissuaded defendant from cooperating or
communicating with counsel).
33. 466 U.S 668, 686 (1984).
34. Id. at 6F:8.
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (Supp. III 1985). See also Stone, supra note 11, at 544. While the
restraining order prevents transfer or dispersion of the assets, the government subsequently
might include a forfeiture of fees provision in the indictment after acquiring further informa-
tion. Id.
36. The term "fees" does not appear in the statute. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st
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federal prosecutors are able to make sweeping attacks on criminal organiza-
tions. For some prosecutors, this entails scrutiny of lawyer activity, including
efforts to forfeit attorneys' fees. 37 Prosecutors justify these efforts based on
the language of the 1984 Act establishing the government's interest in
forfeited assets "at the time the offense is committed.
38
Regardless of the statutory language of RICO's forfeiture provisions, one
must consider the impact of the forfeiture of attorneys' fees on defendants
and third party attorneys. 3" The forfeiture of attorneys' fees under RICO
Sess. 79 (1969). An earlier draft of a similar forfeiture statute, stating that "nothing in this sec-
tion is intended to interfere with a person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel," by itself would
not appear to resolve the issue of attorney's fees. See also United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp.
1332, 1347 (D. Colo. 1985) (suggesting that the language is persuasive).
37. Stone, supra note 11, at 561.
38. See supra note 5. The language in the RICO statute is similar to CFA. The property of
the defendant may be the subject of forfeiture unless the transferee establishes in a hearing that
he is a bona fide purchaser for value who "at the time of purchase" was reasonably without
cause to believe property was subject to forfeiture. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. III 1985).
39. Although the legislative history and a literal reading of the RICO statute appear to war-
rant forfeiture of attorney's fees, the impact of this forfeiture may be constitutionally, as well as
economically, devastating. A RICO forfeiture may: (1) dissolve a defendant's entire business and
thereby destroy a substantial portion of his livelihood; (2) extinguish or severely impair third
party interest in the same property; and (3) cut short alienability and enjoyment of all potentially
forfeitable property before trial to the economic detriment of both defendant and third party.
See Reed & Gill, supra note 2, at 71. See also United States v. L'Hoste, 615 F.2d 383, 384-85
(5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274, 280 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
The primary argument raised by RICO defendants is that the issuance of a restraining order
impermissibly interferes with their ability to retain private counsel of choice. To the extent that
restraining orders entirely deprive defendants of the means to hire attorneys, defendants are en-
titled to court-appointed counsel. Thus, it is necessary to decide whether the availability of ap-
pointed counsel satisfies the sixth amendment when a restraining order makes a nonindigent
defendant financially unable to retain private counsel. Simply stated, the question is whether
court-appointed public defenders are effective substitutes for members of private defense firms
to represent a defendant charged with a complex RICO violation.
The expertise of public defenders echoes a self-serving suggestion forwarded by members of
the criminal defense bar that an elite cadre of lawyers are uniquely qualified to represent defen-
dants in complex criminal litigation such as RICO. Several noted authorities recognize the
devastating effect that representation by court-appointed counsel will have on a RICO defen-
dant's constitutional guarantees. RICO prosecutions involve extremely complex and prolonged
trials that can only be handled by a small number of lawyers nationally. By allowing the govern-
ment to restrain a defendant's assets with such a low standard of persuasion, the government
seeks to disqualify the best-qualified lawyers, and their firms may be the only available firms
practicing in the relevant field of law.
In stark contrast, the court in Rogers emphatically rejected the appointed-counsel solution.
According to Rogers, the appointed-counsel solution
pays no more than lip service to the constitutional guarantee because it ignores the
exigencies of RICO cases, which include the vast resources or expertise of the
average federal public defender's office, the significant resources the government
devotes to RICO prosecutions, the complexity of issues in RICO cases, and the
length of time a RICO investigation may consume.
Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349. If attorneys' fees are subject to forfeiture after conviction only
upon showing of probable cause, in the view of the Rogers' court, no member of the private bar





must be consistent with the fair trial principles implicit in the fifth and sixth
amendments in order to be constitutionally valid.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Prosecutorial discretion in subjecting a criminal defendant's assets to
forfeiture ' hls a serious impact on the sixth amendment's guarantee of the
right to effective assistance of counsel of one's choice. 4 ' More specifically,
applying the RICO statute to attorneys' fees permits the federal prosecutor to
select defense counsel of the government's choice, or at least to restrict
significantly the pool of available defense counsel. Simply stated, the govern-
ment can limit the willingness of attorneys to defend RICO defendants by
liberally naming all of defendant's assets in the indictment, leaving the defen-
dant with no financial means to retain counsel. Consequently, the courts
must appoint a public defender to represent the accused. As the ABA pointed
out in its Recommendation on Forfeiture in July 1985, there appears to be
some truth to the claim that in permitting the government to pursue
forfeiture of attorneys' fees, "the right to counsel will be empty because it
will depend on what the government is willing to provide for a particular
defendant.
42
The prosecutors, on the other hand, claim that the objective of RICO's
new forfeiture provision is to provide a means for the government to con-
fiscate the ill-gotten gains of criminal enterprise and to prevent the illegal
transfer of those gains to third parties.4 3 It would be naive to presume that
lawyers cart be nothing other than innocent third parties and, as a result,
should be excluded from the reach of the forfeiture law. Thus, the govern-
ment claims it is entirely consistent with the purpose and language of the
forfeiture laws for the government to pursue forfeiture of attorneys' fees that
are paid with the proceeds of crime.
44
40. Cf. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13, EC 7-14 (1980); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103 (1980).
41. The role of the defense counsel is completely ignored when the government abuses the
purposes of the forfeiture statute and maneuvers to "choose" defense counsel for the accused.
The Rogers court recognized this abuse of an accused's sixth amendment guarantee when it
stated that the "government would possess the ultimate tactical advantage of being able to ex-
clude competent defense counsel as it chooses. By appending a charge of forfeiture to an indict-
ment under RICO, the prosecutor could exclude those defense counsel which he felt to be skilled
adversaries." SeE Stone, supra note 11, at 568 (quoting Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349).
42. Recommendation on Forfeiture, 1985 ABA CRIM. JusT. REP. 3 (approved by ABA
policy, July 1985).
If, on the other hand, the government threatens forfeiture of the fees only if certain attorneys
are retained, it is able to target for disqualification the best lawyers and require the defendant to
hire less competent counsel. See Margolin & Coliver, Pretrial Disqualification of Criminal
Defense Counsel, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 227, 229 (1982). See also Chambers, Criminal Lawyers
in Study Say New Laws Inhibited Case Choices, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1985, at A20, col. I
(reporting that criminal defense lawyers believe new federal laws, such as the CFA, are "aimed
primarily at the nation's most experienced and most successful lawyers").
43. Stone, supra note 11, at 568.
44. Id. This view may be unrealistic if courts follow the reasoning of pre-1984 Act decisions.
[Vol. 40
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The crucial point when considering prosecutorial discretion is that the pro-
secutor can use the threat of forfeiture of fees to reduce the pool of counsel
available to the defendant. In United States v. Badalamenti,4" the court
recognized the impact of prosecutorial misconduct on the sixth amendment
guarantees. In the court's view, "the problem is the unlikelihood of obtain-
ing a lawyer at all if the lawyer will incur forfeiture of his fees upon the
client's conviction. " 6 As the court noted, it is irrelevant that forfeiture will
be denied if the defendant's money is clean.
The sixth amendment's qualified right to effective counsel of choice
belongs to guilty defendants as well as innocent ones. In Badalamenti the
court summarized the problems inherent in the prosecutorial discretion used
in forfeiture cases. No one is more aware of the likelihood that the money
may come from such prohibited activity than the lawyer who is asked to
represent the defendant. The court stated:
If the statute applies to him, its message to him is "Do not repre-
sent this defendant or you will lose your fee." That being the kind
of message lawyers are likely to take seriously, the defendant will
find it difficult or impossible to secure representation. By the
Sixth Amendment we guarantee the defendant the right of
counsel, but by the forfeiture provision of... RICO ... we in-
sure that no lawyer will accept the business.47
Conflicts of Interest
RICO defendants are the first to argue that ethical problems lurk on the
periphery of the right to counsel argument. Simply stated, the attorney may
be more interested in saving his fees from RICO forfeiture than providing the
best defense for the accused, as required by the sixth amendment's guarantee
of effective counsel. As previously mentioned, the court in Strickland defined
"effective" assistance of counsel to include some very basic duties."' The
duty to advocate the defendant's cause is derived from counsel's function as
assistant to the defendant. The more particular duties to consult with the
E.g., United States v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1984) (denying forfeiture of fees paid to
attorney since proceeds of illegal activity were no longer in possession of defendant); United
States v. McManigal, 723 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1983) (same). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
has overruled these decisions in United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 1985). Of
course, not every judge agrees. Id. at 804-07 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (objecting to the ambiguity
of the forfeiture legislation and noting that historically forfeiture has been regarded with "deep
suspicion"). Neither does the ABA, which approves of forfeiture only if the attorney engages in
"criminal conduct" or accepts a fee as a "fraud" or a "sham." There is no indication under the
ABA proposal that acceptance of fees paid from proceeds of crime would amount to "criminal
conduct," "fraud," or "sham."
45. 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
46. Id. at 197-98.
47. Id. at 196.




defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of im-
portant developments in the course of the prosecution are also derived from
this duty. Counsel must bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render
the trial a reliable adversarial testing process."9
RICO defendants urge that an attorney whose fee may be subject to
forfeiture has an inevitable conflict of interest because he may be forced to
choose between litigation strategy likely to preserve his fee and a strategy
likely to result in forfeiture but which will keep his client out of prison.3 0 For
example, an attorney who desires to avoid forfeiture of his fee might recom-
mend that his client plead guilty to a lesser offense not punishable by
forfeiture when a wiser course for the client would be to stand trial on the
original charges. 1 Contrary to the Strickland standard, an attorney might be
tempted to reject a plea bargain that includes forfeiture of tainted assets,
even though going to trial would increase the client's risk of a lengthy prison
term. 2 In either event, the lawyer would be breaching his duty to give in-
dependent and disinterested advice to his client.
Case law clearly recognizes the denial of the defendant's constitutional
rights when an attorney refuses to continue defending a client who cannot
supply him with money. 3 The attorney is duty bound to represent the client
to the best of his ability. However, the conflict arises because representing a
criminal defendant to the best of one's ability may be substantially affected
where there is no corresponding economic motive. The attorney who is
receiving an adequate compensation is much more likely to provide effective
assistance of counsel than will an attorney whose fees are subject to
forfeiture to the government. This conflict of interest, between remaining
loyal to a client by effective representation and concentrating efforts on
securing attorneys' fees, will inherently arise regardless of the professional
ethics that impose a duty of loyalty on attorney. In Badalamenti the court
noted that:
A lawyeri who was so foolish, ignorant, beholden or idealistic as
to take the business would find himself in inevitable positions of
conflict. His obligation to be well informed on the subject of his
49. Id. at 685.
50. See Brickey, supra note 20, at 534.
51. United States v. Tanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (CBM), slip op. at 13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4,
1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
52. Tanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 at 14 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 5-103(A); EC 5-1, 2.3, 7 (1979)). See also Maxwell v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 3d 736,
161 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1980) (fee arrangement assigning to attorney dramatic rights to defendant's
story and waiving attorney-client privilege violates duty to give disinterested counsel), vacated,
30 Cal. App. 3d 606, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982).
There is another dimension to the lawyer's conflict problem. If the government intends to seek
forfeiture of fees paid to whomever represents the defendant, the defendant's right to conflict-
free counsel will be compromised.
53. See, e.g., People v. Woods, 117 Misc. 2d 1, 457 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1982); Suffolk Road-
ways, Inc. v. T. Bayles Minuse, 56 Misc. 2d 6, 287 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1968).
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client's case would conflict with his interest in not learning the
facts that would endanger his fee .... The statute would give at-
torneys a motive to negotiate a guilty plea that did not involve
forfeiture, rather than fight the case expending valuable time and
increasing the risk of incurring forfeiture.54
Attorney-Client Confidences
A defendant's right to a fair trial is jeopardized when the threat of
forfeiture of fees manufactures conflicts of interest and impairs the
attorney's ability to be a partisan advocate. Such a result implicates the
attorney-client privilege and endangers the attorney's ability to fulfill the
duty of loyalty owed to the client under the Constitution. To the extent that
the forfeiture provisions in RICO and the CFA permit the government to
create this conflict by pursuing forfeiture of attorney's fees, the statute is un-
constitutional as applied. 5
The defense attorneys' arguments concerning a breach of the attorney-
client privilege are grounded in the sixth amendment's guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel. Simply stated, although fee information is not gen-
erally protected by the attorney-client privilege, the lawyer may fear that he
will have to testify about his knowledge of the defendant's financial affairs
and possibly compromise privileged communications. This fear of disclosure
has the effect of chilling communications between attorney and client,
thereby encroaching on the right to counsel. As Judge Kane opined in
Rogers, "the threat of an attorney having to disclose information obtained
from his client will chill the openness of those communications, thereby im-
pinging on the right to counsel." 56
In defining the limits of the attorney-client privilege, courts have held that
client identity and fee information, although incriminating, generally are not
confidential communications and, therefore, cannot be privileged com-
munications.17 However, even a cursory glance at the forfeiture language in
RICO reveals that an attorney will have to disclose more than the mere iden-
tity of his client and their fee arrangement. The RICO forfeiture provision
provides:
Any property that is subsequently transferred to a person other
than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of
54. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196.
55. Stone, supra note 11, at 570.
56. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Colo. 1985).
57. See, e.g., In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984) (privilege only encompasses com-
munications necessary to obtain informed legal advice); In re Witness Before Special Grand
Jury, 729 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1984) (fee information privileged only if so much is already known
that its disclosure would reveal a confidential communication); In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591
(9th Cir. 1983) (disclosure of amount of fees not privileged); Payden v. United States, 605 F.
Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985) (mere disclosure
of fee information by defense counsel that is adverse to defendant does not affect counsel's abili-




forfeiture unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to
subsection (in) that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of prop-
erty who at the time of the purchase was reasonably without cause
to believe the property was subject to forfeiture.8
The information sought for disclosure under section 1963 to prevent
forfeiture of a third party's property clearly goes beyond disclosure concern-
ing mere fee arrangements. The attorney, in some circumstances, may be
forced to disclose all financial information revealed by his client in order to
prove that he is a bona fide purchaser for value and, therefore, avoid
forfeiture.
The language under section 1963(c) and (in) requires that a third party
transferee establish in a hearing that he received defendant's assets without
knowledge and in good faith belief that the assets were not illegally obtained.
An attorney must come forward with information revealed to him by his
client to show that he did not have actual notice that his fees were obtained
by the illegal actions. Thus, it may be virtually impossible for an attorney to
present information that ensures a right to a professional fee without reveal-
ing privileged communication. If nothing else, ongoing breaches of the
attorney-client privilege, arising solely by operation of a statutory scheme,
provide support for the view that the procedure is inconsistent with partisan
advocacy.9
The underlying rationale for the attorney-client privilege is that "encourag-
ing clients to make the fullest disclosure to their attorneys enables the latter
to act more effectively, justly, and expeditiously."" In order for the sixth
amendment guarantees to be upheld, the court in Payden v. United States6"
noted that there must be a full and frank discussion between defense counsel
and defendant.62 In In re Shargel, the court recognized the chilling effect that
the forfeiture provisions will have on the attorney-client privilege:
The attorney must thus decide early in the course of consultation
whether to warn the client against communication which, however
necessary to the rendering of competent legal advice, might be
disclosed to an adversary in litigation .... Inadequate legal
counsel would fall upon the innocent as well as the guilty and
would in the long run impair the ability of courts to administer
justice fairly.63
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. 111 1985).
59. See Stone, supra note 11, at 573.
60. Id. See also J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE § 503(02) (1985); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (for fully informed legal advice, client must confide in
attorney); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (interest of justice requires client to
utilize attorney's ,.ervice without fear of subsequent disclosure).
61. 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
62. Id. at 847.
63. In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984).
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The court further notes that consultation and the payment of a fee may be
preconditions to seeking legal advice. Logically, then, the lack of a privilege
against disclosure in an attorney-client relationship may discourage some per-
sons from seeking legal advice at all."
Judge Level in Badalamenti described the dilemma encountered by the
defense counsel: "His obligation to be well informed on the subject of his
client's case would conflict with his interest in not learning facts that would
endanger his fee by telling him his fee was the proceeds of illegal activity."
65
More broadly, it can be argued that the sense of trust and confidence in a
relationship between an attorney and client is significantly impaired by the
prospect that an attorney may become a witness against the client in the
pending prosecution. Thus, regardless of the general rule that fee informa-
tion is not protected by the attorney-client privilege, it is the chilling effect on
the attorney's and the client's communication that has a serious impact on
the defendant's sixth amendment rights.
Objections Raised by the ABA
Although nothing on the face of RICO or the CFA excepts attorneys' fees
from criminal forfeiture, the American Bar Association strongly objects to
the new forfeiture laws as unconstitutional and "draconian." 66 The objec-
tions listed in a recent ABA Section Report typify the response of the defense
bar to forfeiture of attorneys' fees:
1. It denies an accused the right, under the Sixth Amendment,
to retain counsel of his or her choice;
2. It impedes the ability of such retained counsel to render ef-
fective assistance;
3. It impairs the relationship of confidence and confidentiality
between an accused and his or her counsel;
4. It allows the government to manipulate the roster of
counsel, or to disqualify counsel by seeking to compel testimony
by the lawyer against the client;
5. It discourages or disallows competent attorneys from agree-
64. Id. This chilling effect extends beyond the scope of attorney-client conversations. The
conflict fostered by the statute may cause the attorney to be less than a zealous advocate of his
client's interests in order to preserve the right to fees, thereby intentionally limiting communica-
tions with the client. How can defense counsel zealously defend against a RICO violation while
taking care to remain partially ignorant of the defendant's financial background in order to pro-
tect the right to attorneys' fees? Such a balancing act suggests that the attorney and client have
adverse interests. See Stone, supra note 11, at 573.
65. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
66. See Krieger & Van Dusen, The Lawyers, The Client and The New Law, 22 AM. CIuM. L.
REV. 737 (1984); Buffone, Forfeiture ofAttorneys' Fees and the Effect of the Crime Control Act
of 1984, 11 DRUG L. REP. 145 (1985); Margolin, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees and the Future of
the Criminal Defense Bar, in CHAMPION (June 1985); Reed, Criminal Forfeiture Under the Com-




ing to represent clients in criminal cases which involve allegations
of forfeiture; and
6. ]It diverts the efforts and energies of attorneys from the
preparation of the defense of an accused by requiring them to
litigate issues related to their attorney-client relationship. 67
In sum, two basic objections exist. First, when the government requests
forfeiture of attorneys' fees, it has impaired constitutional protections
because the defendant might not be able to retain counsel of choice or effec-
tive counsel. Second, in order to obtain fees for services rendered, the at-
torney must assert a claim in a post-trial, third party hearing that may
amount to a disclosure of confidential attorney-client communications.6"
This attack by the ABA on the statute voices objections to the forfeiture of
attorneys' fees in constitutional dimensions. The statute is unconstitutional
as applied because it fails to afford defendants in a criminal case the right to
effective counsel guaranteed by the Constitution.
Interpretation of RICO's Forfeiture Provisions to Avoid
Constitutional Violations
Considering the risks of depriving a defendant of the right to effective
assistance of counsel and the right to a fair trial, the benefit of additional
procedural safeguards could prove to be invaluable. To dispel the concerns
about the constitutional deficiencies inherent in RICO, the Justice Depart-
ment issued guidelines for prosecutors seeking criminal forfeiture.19 The
guidelines require that specific threshold criteria be met before United States
attorneys may pursue assets transferred as attorneys' fees and require high-
level Justice Department review of every decision to seek forfeiture of at-
torneys' fees.7" Since the guidelines do not establish any independent rights
on the part of the defendant to the procedures set forth, the failure of pro-
secutors to follow the guidelines will leave the defendant without a basis for
complaint.7 The Justice Department's guidelines merely attempt to restore
constitutional safeguards to cases involving the forfeiture of a defendant's
assets. Thus, the guidelines should be recognized as constitutional mandates
and not procedures within the discretion of the Attorney General.
Although the Justice Department rejects any distinction between legitimate
and sham transactions as a basis for determining whether fees are subject to
forfeiture,7 2 the guidelines treat the two cases differently. If there are
reasonable grounds to believe the transfer is a fraudulent transaction de-
signed to.slhdeld otherwise forfeitable assets from statutory forfeiture, the
67. See ABA CRIM. JUST. REP., supra note 42. See also Stone, supra note 11, at 545.
68. See supra note 67.
69. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATrORNEY'S MANUAL §§ 9-111.000 to 9-111.700 (1980).
70. Id.
71. Id. § 9-111.300.
72. Id. § 9.111.210.
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NOTES
guidelines permit pursuit of those assets without additional proof.7"
Significantly, reasonable cause to believe the transaction is a sham may not
be based solely on the transfer of a forfeitable asset to an attorney as a legal
fee. Instead, some evidence of a scheme to ensure the client's continued ac-
cess to the beneficial use of the asset and to defeat the government's ability
to forfeit the property must be present.
74
On the other hand, if the assets have been transferred to an attorney as
legitimate payment for legal representation in a criminal matter, the govern-
ment cannot pursue forfeiture unless it has reasonable grounds to believe that
the attorney had actual knowledge" of the forfeitability of the particular
asset 76 at the time of the transfer. The guidelines contemplate that knowledge
of the government's claim may be established in essentially three ways: (1)
proof of knowledge that the particular asset is the subject of a civil forfeiture
proceeding; (2) knowledge that the particular asset is subject to a preindict-
ment or preconviction restraining order in connection with a criminal pro-
secution; or (3) knowledge that the particular asset is the subject of a
forfeiture allegation in a criminal indictment.
77
The government may rely upon a defendant's trial testimony, voluntary
disclosure of communications with his attorney, and other uncompelled dis-
closures of confidential communications to establish the attorney's
knowledge of the client's livelihood when determining whether it is reason-
able to believe the attorney knew the asset was derived from criminal miscon-
duct. 78 Although the government may employ several means to determine the
attorney's knowledge of potential forfeitability, the government may not
establish knowledge through compelled disclosure of confidential com-
munications made by the client during representation. Adherence to the
Justice Department guidelines should reduce the number of forfeiture cases
in which conflicts of interest arise. When the guidelines have been im-
plemented, the government must identify with particularity which assets are
forfeitable before they are transferred as a legal fee. Therefore, the attorney
will know at the outset whether the assets accepted as a fee are subject to
forfeiture.
A second method of combatting the concerns of third party attorneys and
RICO defendants has been suggested in the Justice Department guidelines.
This method involves a pretrial hearing that increases the government's
burden in forfeiture cases. Whether held before or after issuance of the ex
parte restraining order, the purpose of the pretrial hearing is the same: to
force the government to proffer evidence supporting pretrial restrictions on
the use and alienability of property. The government must introduce evidence
73. Id. § 9-111.410.
74. Id.
75. Id. § 9-111.430.
76. Id. § 9-111.570.
77. Id. § 9-111.511.




that (1) the defendant's conviction is likely; (2) the assets listed in the indict-
ment are subject to forfeiture upon conviction; and (3) absent a restraining
order the defendant is likely to dissipate these assets.
79
Conclusion
Criminal forfeiture is a sanction imposed to dispossess persons of property
obtained through wrongdoing. Congress has declared criminal forfeiture
statutes to be integral to the government's battle against criminal racketeer-
ing on the theory that forfeiture of assets involved in crime disturbs the
economic power base of criminal organizations.
According to some courts, a RICO forfeiture is not that severe, for it is
limited to a defendant's interest in the enterprise and takes effect only after
criminal conviction. To the contrary, a RICO forfeiture may destroy a
substantial portion of a defendant's livelihood and severely impair third
party interests in the same property. A forfeiture with such far-reaching
destructive implications must be carefully examined under the constitutional
safeguards owed to criminal defendants.
Criminal forfeiture of attorney fees as an integral part of criminal litiga-
tions raises both practical and policy problems. On a policy level, the judicial
system has an incentive to prevent erosion of the quality and availability of
counsel through the creation of a financial disincentive to the practice of
criminal litigation." As a practical matter, the forfeiture of attorney fees will
require adjudication of the source of attorney fees. As a part of the defen-
dant's criminal trial, proof of this financial source will raise difficult ques-
tions involving constitutional guarantees and privileges. Although the Justice
Department guidelines do not resolve every concern about forfeiture of at-
torneys' fees, they substantially reduce the number of potential ethical issues
that impair the attorney's role as an advocate.
Karen S. Russell
79. See Reed & Gill, supra note 2, at 84.
80. See United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830
(1980) ("effect of a forfeiture under § 1963 is the functional equivalent of a forfeiture in rem.");
United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 141 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982) (RICO involves "limited forfeiture of property utilized to
violate the criminal law."). See also United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 964 (5th Cir. 1982)
(en bane) (Politz, J., dissenting) (Congress has frequently used the onus of specific forfeitures in
combatting legal activities; RICO is so restricted.).
8 1. See Watson, On the Low Status of the Criminal Bar: Psychological Contributions of the
Law School, 43 TEx. L. Rav. 289 (1964) (legal education and diminutive remuneration con-
tribute to low status of criminal defense bar in legal community),
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